Abstract-Given a finite transition system and a regular predicate, we address the problem of computing a controller enforcing the opacity of the predicate against an attacker (that partially observes the system), supposedly trying to push the system to reveal the predicate. Assuming that the controller can only control a subset of the events it observes (possibly different from the ones of the attacker), we show that an optimal control always exists and provide sufficient conditions under which it is regular and effectively computable. These conditions rely on the inclusion relationships between the observable alphabets of the attacker and the controller and the controllable alphabet.
I. INTRODUCTION
Opacity, whose goal is to oppose diagnosis, was introduced in [1] and [2] . Given a system, equipped with a map sending (prefixes of) executions to observations, an opaque predicate is a set of executions such that every execution in the set is observationally equivalent to some execution outside the set. So, membership to an opaque predicate is never disclosed by observation. Anonymity and non-interference may be reduced to the opacity of suitable predicates for suitable observation maps [2] . In this paper, we concentrate on finite transition systems labelled over an alphabet Σ, on predicates defined by regular sets of execution traces in Σ * , and on observation maps induced by the projection of execution traces on a sub-alphabet Σ a of Σ, modeling the attacker's alphabet. Under these assumptions, opacity can be decided although it cannot be expressed in the modal µ-calculus [3] .
We are specially interested in cases when the predicate of interest is non-opaque, i.e. the system leaks confidential information. A possible arrangement is then to augment the system with a monitor, responsible for detecting when confidential information was leaked or will be leaked unless one halts the system immediately. Assuming that monitors observe only a subset Σ m of the events of the system, which needs not be a subset of Σ a , necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of monitors were obtained in [4] . We want to take one step further by providing a controller that does enforce the opacity of the predicate by disabling at each stage (of an execution) the least subset of events such that confidential information is not leaked sooner or later. Assuming that controllers observe all events and all events can be controlled, sufficient conditions for the existence of finite state controllers were proposed in [5] (the opacity of This work is partially supported by the RNRT Politess project. several predicates is enforced there on concurrent attackers). We consider here one predicate and one attacker, but we relax the assumptions on controllable and observable events. Namely, if Σ is the set of events of the system, let Σ a ⊆ Σ be the attacker's alphabet, and let Σ c and Σ m be the subsets of events controlled or observed by the controller, respectively, then we assume that Σ c ⊆ Σ m and Σ a compares both with Σ c and Σ m .
Let L(G) ⊆ Σ * be the regular language of the system G and let L ϕ ⊆ Σ * be the regular but non-opaque predicate whose opacity should be enforced by control. Not taking into account controllability and observability, there is a largest subset L 1 of L(G) such that L ϕ is opaque w.r.t. L 1 and Σ a , and L 1 is regular [5] . As Σ c ⊆ Σ m , there exists a most permissive controller K 1 confining the system to L 1 and K 1 is regular. Unfortunately, this controller does not always enforce the opacity of L ϕ (unless Σ a ⊆ Σ c or Σ m ⊆ Σ a as we shall explain later on). The reason why it fails to do so is that a complete description of the closed-loop system may be available to the attacker and new confidential information on the execution may be inferred from this knowledge. To solve the problem, one might think of iterating the construction, thus producing a decreasing chain of regular languages
Unfortunately, the iteration may be infinite, hence it may not yield an effective construction of ∩ i K i and it does not show either that this limit is regular.
Our contribution is twofold. For the cases Σ a ⊆ Σ c and Σ m ⊆ Σ a , we show that the optimal opacity control can be computed within the framework of Ramadge and Wonham's theory. For the remaining case Σ c ⊆ Σ a ⊆ Σ m 1 , for which the iteration may be infinite, we supply an alternative algorithm that computes the limit of the infinite iteration described above. The algorithm works in double exponential time. We do not investigate optimizations nor heuristics in this paper for our primary goal is to show that the construction of the optimal opacity control is effective.
This work has loose relationship with the earlier work done by Schneider on security automata [6] , subsequently extended to edit automata [7] . The goal pursued in [6] was to produce interface automata that enforce security policies L ϕ , meaning that the interface automaton rejects those inputs from the environment that would lead the system to leave the subset of safe execution prefixes L ϕ . In our case, the role of the controller is not to confine the executions of the system 1 Remember that Σa is assumed to compare with both Σc and Σm.
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978-1-4244-2593-8/08/$25.00 ©2008 IEEEto L ϕ but to the largest opaque subset of L(G) w.r.t. L ϕ and Σ a . On the other hand, whenever Σ c ⊆ Σ a , our controllers may be seen as interface automata, as they reject events from the attacker's alphabet exclusively.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 fixes some notation. Section 3 brings back the basics of opacity properties and it sets the opacity control problem. Section 4 brings back the theory of Supervisory Control. Section 5, which is the core of the paper, contains our contribution. Optimal opacity control is obtained whenever Σ c ⊆ Σ m and Σ a compares with both of them. Moreover, we produce an example showing that the problem cannot be solved in the framework of Ramadge and Wonham's theory when Σ c ⊆ Σ a ⊆ Σ m . Section 6 is a brief conclusion pointing to open problems.
II. NOTATIONS
Let Σ be a finite alphabet of events. A string is a finite sequence of events. The set of all strings is denoted by
We assume that systems are Labelled Transitions Systems (LTS) as follows.
Definition 1 (LTS): An LTS over Σ is a 4-tuple
where Q G is a finite set of states, Σ is the finite set of events of G, q G 0 ∈ Q G is the initial state, and
We extend → G to arbitrary sequences by setting q ε → G q for all states q, and q
→ G q} (the set of partial execution traces starting in a state of I G and ending in a state of F G ).
Opacity control aims at preventing an attacker A from deducing confidential information on the execution of a system from the observation of a subset of events Σ a . To model this, we use the classical notion of projection. We simply denote by P Σa the projection from Σ * to Σ * a that erases in a sequence of Σ * all events not in Σ a . This definition extends to (regular) languages:
Given an LTS G over Σ and a set of observable events Σ a ⊆ Σ, the set of observed traces of G is P Σa (L(G)). Given two sequences s, s
Σa (P Σa (s)) the equivalence class of s.
III. THE BASICS OF OPACITY
Consider an LTS G over Σ, a regular predicate L ϕ ⊆ Σ * , and a sub-alphabet Σ a ⊆ Σ. The alphabet Σ a defines the interface provided to the user for interacting with G. The predicate L ϕ represents a confidential information on the execution of G, i.e. if the current trace of execution is s ∈ Σ * , the user should not be able to deduce from P Σa (s) and G that s ∈ L ϕ . In this setting, the user is considered as an attacker (A) willing to catch the confidential information and armed for this with full information on the structure of G but only partial information upon its behavior, namely the observed trace in Σ * a . In order that the confidential information is never leaked, it is necessary and sufficient that L ϕ is an opaque predicate according to the following definition, adapted from [2] . 
If L ϕ is not opaque w.r.t. L(G) and Σ a , then it is still possible to restrict the behavior of G so that L ϕ becomes opaque. This can be obtained by withdrawing from
Given a system G and a predicate L ϕ , there exists a supremal prefix-closed sub-language of 
and it is given by
Intuitively, the language P
) reveals L ϕ (these sequences are extended with Σ * because, once L ϕ has been revealed, this holds for ever).
It follows from proposition 1 that OP
can be empty. In that case, there is no way to enforce opacity by restricting the behavior of the system.
, then no sequence observationally 2 Note that this language is not prefix-closed.
In other words, when computing the supremal sub-language of L(G) with respect to which L ϕ is opaque, each equivalence class of L(G) w.r.t. Σ a is either entirely kept or removed.
Our goal is to enforce opacity by supervisory control, which puts strong conditions on the admissible restrictions of L(G) (due to the so-called controllability and observability conditions that a controller has to fulfill to be implementable). We will also compute the most permissive opacity control in the form of a regular sub-language of L(G). Next section brings back a few notions of supervisory control theory.
IV. THE BASICS OF SUPERVISORY CONTROL
Given a prefix-closed behavior K ⊆ L(G) ⊆ Σ * expected from the system G, the goal of supervisory control is to enforce this behavior on G by pairing this system with a monitor (also called controller) that observes a subset Σ m of the events in Σ and controls a subset Σ c of the events in Σ, i.e. enables or disables each instance of these controllable events. Σ \ Σ c is the set of uncontrollable events. Σ \ Σ m is the set of unobservable events. We now recall some basic concepts of supervisory control theory. More information on the computational aspects can be found in [8] .
This definition states that if K is controllable, then no uncontrollable events need to be disabled to exactly confine the system L(G) to K. Note that the union of an arbitrary number of controllable languages is controllable.
Definition 4: Assuming that
Intuitively, K is observable, if K can be exactly recovered from its projection P Σm (K) and L(G). Note that this is a necessary condition for a controller that forces the system to behave like K to be implementable. In other words, from a control point of view, when disabling an event c after the execution of s, then c has to be disabled after all execution traces of [s] m . Under the assumption Σ c ⊆ Σ m , the union of an arbitrary number of observable languages is observable. Therefore, under this assumption, both controllability and observability are stable under union of languages, and there exists a supremal controllable and observable prefix-closed sub-language of K, that we denote
The language CO ↑ (K, L(G), Σ c , Σ m ) represents the largest behavior included in K(⊆ L(G)) that can be enforced by control. Moreover, CO ↑ is monotone in the first argument.
is observable, this set and its relative complement are unions of equivalence classes of ∼ m .
Similarly to lemma 2, the equivalence classes of L(G) w.r.t. Σ m are preserved by control.
V. ENFORCING OPACITY BY CONTROL
Our purpose is to solve the opacity control problem stated as follows. Problem: Show that the set of controllable and observable restrictions (i.e. sub-languages) of L(G) enforcing the opacity of L ϕ either is empty or has a greatest element and compute this maximal permissive controllable and observable sub-language of L(G). In the sequel, we shall assume that an attacker has a full knowledge of the structure of G, knows the interface of the controller Σ m and is able to perform in his head all calculations that the administrator has made to compute this controller. In particular, this entails that the structure of the controlled system may be available to the attacker, thus possibly inducing new confidential information flow. This assumptions are at present informal, but might be formalized e.g. using language theory and epistemic logic. Moreover, in the rest of the paper, it is always assumed that Σ c ⊆ Σ m (the controllable events are observed by the controller).
A. Characterization of the solution
We now investigate the existence of a supremal solution to the opacity control problem. To do so, we consider the set
and
Otherwise, no control can enforce the opacity of
then it is the union of an arbitrary number of languages that are controllable, observable and such that L ϕ is opaque w.r.t. the corresponding restrictions of L(G). These three properties are stable under arbitrary union of languages (under the hypoth- (1) and (2) .
Even though the previous proposition entails the existence of a unique maximal sub-language of L(G), that is controllable, observable and in restriction to which L ϕ is opaque, we still have to examine whether this language is regular (or at least, to exhibit sufficient conditions for regularity) and to provide an effective computation of this language.
It may be remarked that restricting languages to ensure controllability and observability does not always preserve opacity and the other way round (See Example 2). Thus, in a first attempt towards an effective computation of CO-OP
following the classical methodology of Supervisory Control Theory 4 , we establish below a fix-point characterization of this language by alternating the computation of the supremal sub-language that ensures the opacity of L ϕ and the supremal controllable and observable sub-language.
Consider the operator
Remark that K(•) is monotone w.r.t. set inclusion. Now, as the prefix-closed subsets of L(G) form a complete sub-lattice of P(Σ * ), it follows from Knaster-Tarski's Theorem [10] that K(•) has a greatest fix-point in this sub-lattice. Let 
does not ensure that this language can be always computed by a finite iteration as the following example shows.
Example 2: Consider the LTS G shown in Fig. 3 where Σ a = {A, B, c}, Σ m = Σ, Σ c = {c} and the predicate L ϕ is the set of the sequences that reach the states represented with squares in G. In L(G), the sole string that belongs to L ϕ , and therefore reveals it, is c.c.A, which requires to disable the second event c, seeing that A is uncontrollable. The LTS that generates K 1 is represented in Fig. 4(a) . In K 1 , c.c.A has disappeared and Fig. 4 Fig. 5(a) . In K 2i , the string (c.u) 2i .c.c.A reveals L ϕ and it must be eliminated by disabling the last c, which is done in the language K 2i+1 (See Fig. 5(b) 
the language computed after i iterations of the operator K(•).

The result (K 2 ) is depicted in
(b). After 2i iterations of the operator K(•), one gets the language K 2i generated by the LTS depicted in
) is regular and one can effectively compute uniformly from the arguments of CO-OP ↑ (•) a finite automaton generating this optimal opacity control.
But first, we establish a proposition that helps to simplify the remaining proofs (In Sections V-B.2 and V-B.3). This proposition states that whenever Σ a ⊆ Σ m ⊆ Σ, we can reformulate the control problem in terms of the observed 
Consider the following languages:
We will prove that H = K.
Let us first prove that L ϕ is opaque w.r.t. H and Σ a . Consider s ∈ H ∩ L ϕ . As P Σm (s) ∈ F and L m ϕ is opaque w.r.t. F and Σ a (by definition of F ), there exists ρ ∈ F such that ρ ∼ a P Σm (s) and ρ ∈ F \ L m ϕ . Then, ∃s
Let us now show that H is controllable. Consider s ∈ H, σ ∈ Σ \ Σ c such that sσ ∈ L(G). Let ρ = P Σm (s). By definition of H, we get ρ ∈ F .
• If σ ∈ Σ m then P Σm (sσ) = ρ and finally sσ ∈ H.
• If σ ∈ Σ m , we have ρ ∈ F and ρσ ∈ P Σm (L(G)). As F is controllable, we get ρσ ∈ F , which entails sσ ∈ H as sσ ∈ P
−1
Σm ({ρσ}). Finally we note that H is observable by construction. As K is the supremal controllable and observable sub-language of L(G) for which L ϕ is opaque, we can conclude that H ⊆ K.
Let us now prove that P Σm (K) ⊆ F .
• Let ρ ∈ P Σm (K). There exists s ∈ K such that P Σm (s) = ρ. Since L ϕ is opaque w.r.t. K and Σ a , there exists s
Since K is controllable, sσ ∈ K and then ρσ = P Σm (sσ) ∈ P Σm (K). So P Σm (K) is controllable. Now, P Σm (K) is obviously observable and we get that P Σm (K) ⊆ F . This implies that P −1
, we conclude that K ⊆ H and finally that H = K.
B. Effective computation of the supremal solution
Next, we investigate three sufficient conditions under
) is regular and effectively computable.These conditions bear upon the inclusion relationships between the alphabets Σ a , Σ m and Σ c .
1) Assumption 1:
Under this assumption, the controller observes and controls only a part of the actions of the attacker, meaning that it is less powerful than the attacker. Nevertheless, this is a sufficient condition allowing to solve the control problem.
Hence, as an immediate consequence of Lemma 3, we also have s ′ ∈ K 1 , which entails that L ϕ is opaque w.r.t. K 1 and Σ a . Hence,
This assumption simply means that the controller can observe all the actions of the attacker and control them.
Based on proposition 4, one can assume, without loss of generality, that Σ m = Σ.
, which is then controllable w.r.t. L, Σ c and observable w.r.t. Σ c and Σ m since Σ m = Σ. Hence,
and we conclude using the result of Proposition 3.
3) Assumption 3:
Under this assumption, even though all actions of the attacker can be observed by the controller, only a part of them can be controlled. One can think that the controller can filter out the requests sent by the attacker to the system, whereas the outputs of the system cannot be disabled by the controller. This is for example the behavior of a firewall for Internet services.
It is easy to check that the system of Example 2, for which the fix-point computation does not terminate, fulfills the assumption of this subsection. This leads us to design a new algorithm.
Using proposition 4, we can assume that Σ m = Σ. We also make the following assumption without loss of generality. The system is given by a deterministic
The predicate L ϕ is specified by a complete and deterministic LTS S ϕ = (Q S , Σ, q S 0 , δ S ) with a set F ϕ of final states such that L ϕ = L Fϕ (S ϕ ) and L(S ϕ ) = Σ * . First, we compute the product of G and S ϕ in order to tag the states in which the predicate L ϕ is satisfied:
and Σ a , then no control can enforce the opacity of L ϕ . So in the sequel, without loss of generality, we assume that L ϕ is opaque w.r.t. L(G ϕ ) \ Σ * Σ c Σ * and Σ a . In particular, this entails that L ϕ is opaque w.r.t. L(G ϕ ) \ Σ * c . Under this assumption, we show that the optimal opacity control may be enforced by a finite state controller, defined by a deterministic LTS C = (Q, Σ, Θ 0 , δ) with the set of states Q = {(X, q) : q ∈ X ⊆ Q} and the initial state Θ 0 = (X 0 , q 0 ) specified by
Intuitively, after the execution of a trace s, the controller is in a state (X, q) when the controlled system is in state q (recall that Σ m = Σ) and X is the best estimate of the current state of G ϕ that the attacker A can get from the observation P Σa (s) of this execution trace. In particular, if no event in Σ a has been produced yet, the best estimate is X 0 (recall that the attacker has full knowledge of the structure of G ϕ ) 6 . In the sequel, we denote T the set of transitions of G ϕ . The main task, for completing the construction of C, is to determine the map α : 2 Q −→ 2 T that tells, for each state (X, q) and simultaneously for all q ∈ X, which set α(X) of controllable transitions of G ϕ the controller does enable, thus
So, in state (X, q), the controller disables the transitions q σ → q ′ ∈ α 0 (X) \ α(X), all of which are controllable. Suppose the correct map α has been computed. Then the set T C (of transitions of C) is inductively defined as the least set of transitions (X, q)
′ , and the estimate X ′ of the attacker is updated from X as follows:
• if σ ∈ Σ c , then
This is coherent with the idea that the attacker has full knowledge of the structure of C, hence of α.
Both lemmas are immediate consequences of the definition of T C .
We explain now the motivation under the definition of the map α. Let (X, q) be a reachable state of the controller, thus q ∈ X, and let q σ → q ′ ∈ T with σ ∈ Σ c . If, for some
But now suppose that, for some w, w ′ ∈ (Σ \ Σ c ) * and q ∈ X, q ′ , q" ∈ Q, q σw → q" ∈ F , w ∼ a w ′ , and
, and the attacker has full knowledge of C and the map α, the transition sequence q σw → q" may now reveal the predicate L ϕ , since the attacker knows that the masking transition
′ is disabled by C. Therefore, α(X) must be computed iteratively as the limit of a decreasing chain started from the finite set α 0 (X).
The definition of α(X) is as follows. Let T range over the subsets of α 0 (X), and for σ ∈ Σ c , let
where Accept(X, T ) = T \ Bad(X, T ) letting
All transitions in Bad(X, T ) should be disabled by control, because they may lead to a confidential information flow by triggering one controllable event followed by an uncontrollable sequence of events.
Remark 2: The controller C is computed by independent iterations of the operator Accept(X, T ) for all X ⊆ Q and T ⊆ α 0 (X). ⋄ We will now prove that L ϕ is opaque w.r.t. L(C), that L(C) is controllable and observable, and that it is the supremal sub-language of L(G) = L(G ϕ ) with these properties.
•
• if P Σc (s) = ε, then s can be decomposed as s = s 1 cs 2 with c ∈ Σ c and s 2 ∈ (Σ\Σ c ) * . There exists (X, q) ∈ Q and q 1 ∈ Q such that Θ 0
Assume for a contradiction that ∀q
and q
for some q ∈ X and s ′ ∈ (Σ\Σ a ) * (Lemma 4), and q ∈ X entails that Θ 0
for some q ′ by definition of T C , hence sσ ∈ L(C). ∈ L(C). As s 1 ∈ L(C) ∩ K, u 1 ∼ a s 1 and u 1 ∈ K, necessarily u 1 ∈ L(C) by definition of s 1 . As u 1 ∈ L(C), u 2 ∈ (Σ \ Σ c ) * , u 1 σu 2 ∈ L(G ϕ ) \ L(C), and L(C) is controllable, necessarily u 1 σ / ∈ L(C) and σ ∈ Σ c . Since u 1 ∈ L(C), there exists (X, q) ∈ Q such that Θ 0 u1 → (X, q). By construction of C, q 0 u1 → q in G ϕ , q ∈ X, and X = {q ∈ L(C) entail that α(X) contains no transition q reviewers and Thierry Jéron for their helpful comments.
VI. CONCLUSION
Given a finite transition system G over Σ and a regular predicate L ϕ ⊆ Σ * , we have addressed the problem of computing a supervisor C that enforces the opacity of L ϕ against an attacker with alphabet Σ a ⊆ Σ, supposedly trying to push G × C to reveal L ϕ (i.e. to produce an execution s such that P Σa (s) = P Σa (s ′ ) ⇒ s ′ ∈ L ϕ for all s ′ ∈ L(G×C)). We have shown how computing the optimal finite state supervisor C with controllable (observable) alphabet Σ c (Σ m ) in all cases where Σ c ⊆ Σ m and Σ a compares with both.
We do not know yet whether the technical answer we have provided to this problem can be extended to cope with more complex situations, such as for instance the case where Σ c ⊆ Σ m and Σ a ⊆ Σ m (the algorithm defined in V-B.3 may not give the optimal supervisor in this case), or the case where one wants to enforce simultaneously the opacity of two predicates with respect to two attackers with different interfaces. An important question to be studied before applications are considered is the relation between opacity and finite state abstraction of possibly infinite state systems. Another topic of interest is the preservation of opacity by algebraic operations of system composition.
